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Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statements: How Significant Should New
Information Be?
I. Introduction
An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) has been a
requirement for "every recommendation or report on propos-
als for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment"1 since the
passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).2 The EIS is required to be supplemented if substan-
tial changes in the federal action occur or significant new in-
formation or circumstances arise concerning the
environment.3
In Wisconsin v. Weinberger,4 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit defined the phrase "significant new infor-
mation" under Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) reg-
ulations 5 as that term relates to Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statements (SEIS). The Court in Weinberger over-
turned the district court's order6 directing the Navy to pre-
pare an SEIS relative to a proposed extremely low frequency
submarine communications project (Project ELF). In evaluat-
ing the significance of the new information, 7 the district court
had used a four-part test which was similar to the test em-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4370 (1982).
3. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i), (ii) (1984). This section states in pertinent part: (c)
Agencies:
(1) Shall prepare supplements to either draft or final environmental impact
statements if: (i) The agency makes substantial changes in the proposed ac-
tions that are relevant to environmental concerns; or (ii) There are significant
new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and
bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.
4. 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984).
5. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1), (i)(ii) (1984). See supra note 3.
6. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 578 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
7. Id. at 1361.
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ployed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Warm
Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble.8 The district court con-
cluded that the Navy had abused its discretion in not consid-
ering new information available to the Navy." In reversing the
district court, the majority rejected the Ninth Circuit's test
and held that an agency's decision not to file an SEIS cannot
be held to be "arbitrary or capricious"10 "unless the new in-
formation provides a seriously different picture" of the
environment."
This note examines the definition used by Weinberger in
determining the significance of new information relative to an
SEIS. Part II briefly addresses the background of NEPA and
the requirements of the SEIS. It also examines the standard
of judicial review that should be afforded an agency's decision
to issue an SEIS. Part III discusses the Weinberger decisions
and Part IV compares the Seventh Circuit's new information
standard to that used by the district court which was based on
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Warm Springs Dam. This note
concludes in Part V that the reasonableness standard enunci-
ated by the district court in Weinberger and the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Warm Springs Dam advances the purposes of NEPA
by encouraging a more rational decision by the agency.
II. Background
Procedural NEPA requirements continue throughout im-
plementation of a proposed project.12 Although an agency may
have filed a final EIS, it is under "a continuing duty to gather
and evaluate new information relevant to the environmental
impact of its action. ' 3 An agency must be careful to monitor
8. 621 F.2d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 1980).
9. 578 F. Supp. at 1364.
10. The court stated that the standard of review of agency action used by the
Seventh Circuit was the Section 706(2)(A) standard of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). This provides that an agency's action must be set
aside if it was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law." 745 F.2d at 417.
11. 745 F.2d at 418.
12. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i) (1984). See supra note 3.
13. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
1985]
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relevant information as it becomes available when the pro-
posed action includes a number of phases to be implemented
over a substantial period of time.1
CEQ regulations s require an agency"6 to supplement an
EIS if the "agency makes substantial changes in the proposed
action that are relevant to environmental concerns 17 or if
"significant new circumstances or information relevant to en-
vironmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or
its impacts'' 8 comes to light. The SEIS must be prepared, cir-
culated and filed in the same manner as an EIS.19 The SEIS is
utilized if the original EIS becomes inadequate during the life
of the project.2 0
The EIS serves three purposes. "The primary purpose of
an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-
forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in
the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of
the Federal Government. 2 1 Secondly, it acts to inform the
public of the proposed action and make the public aware of
agency decisions that may affect the environment.2 2 Finally,
the EIS provides a record for substantive review, which allows
the agency and courts to determine whether the environmen-
tal concerns have been given adequate consideration.23
grounds sub nom, Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984)( citing
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1980).
See also Society for Animal Rights, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 512 F.2d 915, 917-18 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
14. Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475,
1480 (9th Cir. 1983).
15. See infra note 26. "CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial
deference." Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
16. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S.
139 (1981). The Navy is an agency under NEPA. It is required to comply with the
CEQ and Department of Defense regulations that pertain to the issues being ad-
dressed. See 32 C.F.R. § 214.6(D)(4) (1984).
17. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i) (1984). See supra note 3.
18. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (1984). See supra note 3.
19. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(4) (1984).
20. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1984).
21. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1984). See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. at 350; Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
22. 454 U.S. at 143; California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1982).
23. In Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029-30
[Vol. 2
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The purposes behind an EIS promote the policies of
NEPA, which was enacted at a time of great concern for the
environment.2 4 Congress envisioned NEPA as a means to en-
courage "productive and enjoyable harmony between man and
his environment" and to promote "efforts which will prevent
or eliminate damage to the environment. . .and [to] stimulate
the health and welfare of man. 2 5 Congress went on to declare
that it was the responsiblity of the Federal Government to co-
ordinate the policies set forth in NEPA with other national
policies to attain the most beneficial use of the environment
without imposing a safety or health risk on the people.2
(2d Cir. 1983), the court of appeals held that the agency must make an adequate
compilation of relevant information so that a reviewing court can decide if NEPA
requirements were satisfied. Friends of the River v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 720 F.2d 93, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1983) held that "the EIS makes it possible for
the public and reviewing courts to consider conveniently how and why the agency
made its final choices." (Petitioners had asserted that the EIS prepared by the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission for the proposed hydroelectric plant was inade-
quate because it failed to account for a new energy consumption forecast. The court
held that an SEIS was not necessary because this "new" information was of question-
able value.)
24. "The symbolism of the timing of this law did not go unnoted by the Presi-
dent and other concerned Americans, who heralded the 1970's as a decade of environ-
mental concern." R. Jain, G. Stacey, and L. Urban, Environmental Impact Analysis -
A New Dimension in Decision Making 7 (1981).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1982). This section states:
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continu-
ing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means,
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve
and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end
that the Nation may - (1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; (2) assure for all
Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing
surroundings; (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environ-
ment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and
unintended consequences; (4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natu-
ral aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an envi-
ronment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice; (5)
achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and (6) en-
hance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attain-
able recycling of depletable resources.
The implementation of NEPA's policies is accomplished by requiring each fed-
eral agency to prepare a detailed study of the environmental impact of "every recom-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss2/6
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As stated previously, one of the purposes of an EIS is to
ensure that there is a record for review.27 In general the scope
of review that a court has in examining an agency's decision is
narrow.2 8 The agency decision will be upheld if the decision is
based on a consideration of relevant factors2e and made on a
rational basis. 30 "The court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency."31
The circuit courts are split on the standard of review to
be given an agency's decision to issue an EIS or an SEIS 2 A
few courts hold the agency decision to the "arbitrary and ca-
pricious" standard.33 Other courts have stated that the NEPA
requirements under section 102 speak in mandatory terms
and therefore the agency decision not to issue an EIS is not
mendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)
(1982). The guidelines for preparing an EIS are set forth in regulations promulgated
by the Council on Environment Quality (CEQ). The CEQ was established for re-
search purposes and also to advise the President on matters concerning the environ-
ment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1982). The EIS process includes a preliminary draft of an
EIS, see 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (1984); circulation to other agencies and interested
parties, see 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (1984); a revised EIS which addresses legitimate ques-
tions raised, see 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (1984); and finally, distribution of the final EIS to
interested parties, see 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19 (1984).
27. See supra notes 22-23.
28. The standard of review is derived from the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982). Sections 701-706 concern judicial review. An
agency action may be set aside if it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (1982).
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
29. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
30. Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas - Best Freight System, Inc., 419
U.S. 281, 285 (1974), citing Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168 (1962).
31. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
32. For an overview of the federal circuit's standards, see Shea, The Judicial
Standard for Review of Environmental Impact Statement Threshold Decisions, 9
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 63 (1980).
33. For the standard used by the Seventh Circuit, see supra note 10. See Hanley
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972). This view is also supported by at
least one commentator. Shea, supra note 32, at 99-101. But cf. Sierra Club v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d at 1029 (the adequacy of an EIS will be reviewed to
see "if the agency has made an adequate compilation of relevant information" and
"has analyzed it reasonably.")
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within the agency's discretion.,, These and other circuit
courts have gone on to hold that an agency decision not to
issue an EIS or not to supplement an EIS will be upheld as
long as the agency decision was reasonable. 5
The reviewing court must make certain that the EIS's
form, content and preparation foster both decision-making
and informed public participation.3  This will ensure that the
agency has taken the required "hard look" at the alterna-
tives." Determining that the agency has taken a hard look is
the reviewing court's only role.38
III. Wisconsin v. Weinberger
A. The Facts and the District Court Decision
In 1969, the Navy began operation of an extremely low
frequency (ELF) submarine communications test facility in
the Chequamegan National Forest near the town of Clam
Lake in northern Wisconsin. 9 The purpose of the ELF system
was, through the use of extremely low frequency electromag-
netic radiation, to enable the Navy to communicate with a
submarine without requiring the submarine to come to the
surface. This test facility was part of Project Sanguine, which
never entered full-scale development.40
The Navy substituted Project Sanguine with Project Sea-
farer in 1977, which was to include the test facility at Clam
34. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th
Cir. 1974); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1248-49
(10th Cir. 1973).
35. Friends of the River v. F.E.R.C., 720 F.2d at 109 (decision not to supplement
an EIS was reasonable); Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 948 (1st Cir. 1983)(fail-
ure to supplement an EIS was unreasonable because it failed to reflect a downward
revision in oil estimates); Warm Springs Dam, 621 F.2d at 1024; Monarch Chemical
Works, Inc. v. Thone, 604 F.2d 1083, 1088 (8th Cir. 1979) (changes in energy supply
and demand occassioned by a federal project may be cognizable under NEPA); Wyo-
ming Outdoor Coordinating Council, 484 F.2d at 1249 (EIS must be prepared in con-
nection with timber cutting contract).
36. Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974).
37. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 410 n. 21.
38. Id.
39. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 578 F. Supp. 1327, 1334-35 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
40. Id. at 1335.
1985]
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Lake and one additional transmitter in the upper peninsula of
Michigan. An EIS was finalized in December, 1977 with the
Navy concluding that it did not appear that any adverse bio-
logical effects would be felt due to the electromagnetic
radiation.41
President Carter terminated Project Seafarer in February
197842 and it remained inactive until President Reagan ap-
proved Secretary of Defense Weinberger's recommendation to
go forward with the ELF system in October 1981. 43 At that
time, Director of Naval Admiral Communications William D.
Smith, in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, decided
against the preparation of another EIS."
The State of Wisconsin and the County of Marquette,
Michigan moved for a preliminary and permanent injunction
of any additional work on the ELF project until an SEIS was
prepared. The motion for preliminary injunction was denied,45
but the district court held that the Navy abused its discretion
in not evaluating and analyzing significant new information
that had come to light " and ordered a permanent injunction
until an SEIS was prepared.' 7
41. In its final EIS, "the Navy summarized the state of knowledge concerning
biological effects of electromagnetic radiation: 'Totally acceptable scientific knowl-
edge in this regard is not available now to either prove or disprove many important
issues, and is unlikely to be in the very near future despite constantly increasing
interest and research.'" Id. at 1338.
42. Id. at 1335.
43. Id. at 1340.
44. Admiral Smith made this decision based on (1) Navy legal counsel's advice
that NEPA did not require that the EIS be supplemented and (2) his conclusion that
the 1981 proposal was basically similar to the 1977 proposal and, in fact, had a lesser
impact on the environment. Id. at 1351.
45. Id. at 1333.
46. Among the information that the district court considered were (a) a study
that found birth defects and effects on animal behavior and neurophysiology caused
by electromagnetic radiation; (b) articles on Navy-supported slime mold research
which reported alterations in basic cell functions and oxygen consumption due to
electromagnetic radiation; (c) studies on primates at UCLA and at the Pensacola Na-
val Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory which showed effects upon growth rate
and behavior from being exposed to electromagnetic radiation; and (d) epidemiology
studies raising the possible correlation between the incidence of cancer and magnetic
fields in electric power lines which involves the same electromagnetic radiation as in
Project ELF. Id. at 1361-62.
47. Id. at 1365.
7
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The district court held that an SEIS was necessary based
on the significant new information provisions.4 8 Finding that
neither Congress nor CEQ gave a clear definition of "signifi-
cant," the court used a four-part test in evaluating the signifi-
cance of the new information. This test included (1) whether
the information is new (rather than a mere affirmation of old
information); (2) whether the information is meritorious; (3)
whether the information is accessible; and (4) whether a ra-
tional decisionmaker would want to consider the new informa-
tion in making a decision to proceed or not to proceed with
the project.49
The Defense Department's motion for reconsideration
was granted but their motion to vacate the injunction was de-
nied, as was their motion for a stay of the injunction pending
appeal.50  However, the district court's injunction was
amended to allow the Navy to operate the existing Project
ELF facility at Clam Lake. "1 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit entered an order reversing the district court's
decision and vacated the injunction. 52
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1361. The four-part test used by the district court was very similar to
the test used in Warm Springs Dam, 621 F.2d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 1980). Warm
Springs Dam involved the issue of whether the Army Corps of Engineers needed to
prepare an SEIS on a dam being built in Northern California. New information had
come to light that the Maacama Fault might have beencapable of generating an
earthquake larger than the dam had been designed to withstand. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that a decision not to issue an SEIS would be upheld
if the decision not to supplement, despite new information, was based on a reasoned
determination of the new information's significance. In deciding if there was a rea-
soned determination, the court looked at (1) the probable accuracy of the informa-
tion; (2) the degree of care with which it was considered and evaluated by the agency;
(3) the environmental significance of the new information; and (4) the degree to
which the agency supported its decision not to supplement with a statement of expla-
nation. Id. at 1024.
50. 582 F. Supp. 1489, 1497 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
51. Id.
52. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 736 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1984). The Court of Appeals
issued this order to lift the injunction and rendered its opinion at a later date. See
infra note 53.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss2/6
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
B. The Court of Appeals' Decision
1. The Majority
The court in Weinberger53 began with a general discus-
sion of the NEPA requirements.5 4 It held that the standard of
review for an agency's decision not to supplement an EIS was
the arbitrary and capricious standard under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.85
The majority commented that the CEQ regulations did
not define the term "significant" and reasoned that "the
Council on Environmental Quality was willing to rely on the
good faith assessments of the various federal agencies and al-
low them to determine what information would be sufficiently
serious to require the preparation of a full-scale supplement
to the original EIS." 6 It then decided to give a more precise
meaning to the term "significant" as it pertained to the case
at hand.5 7
The Seventh Circuit saw the difference between the deci-
sion to file an initial EIS and the decision to supplement an
EIS, as centering on the fact that the decision to issue an
SEIS is made in light of the already existing research of the
environmental consequences contained in the EIS. The
agency should decide the extent to which the new information
shows environmental consequences not envisioned by the orig-
inal EIS and whether that information "raises new concerns
of sufficient gravity." 59 Finally, the court held that an agency
has not "acted arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding not to
file an SEIS unless new information provides a seriously dif-
ferent picture of the environmental landscape such that an-
other hard look is necessary."60
53. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984). Judge Wood wrote for
the majority and was joined by Judge Cummings. Judge Cudahy filed an opinion con-
curring in part and dissenting in part.
54. Id. at 416-17.
55. Id. See supra note 10.
56. 745 F.2d at 417.
57. Id. at 418.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
[Vol. 2
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The Seventh Circuit continued by stating that circum-
stances may arise when an accumulation of new information
would trigger the agency's duty to supplement its EIS.61 But
it suggested that this would be considered in light of the rea-
sonableness of the amount of time the agency had to review
the new information . 2 The court then considered the evi-
dence presented in the lower court to determine if the new
information met its "seriously different picture" standard. 3
After this review of the evidence, the majority concluded that
the information did not rise to the level of significance re-
quired and reversed the lower court."'
2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent in the Seventh Circuit's decision concluded
that the majority had overstepped the limits of appellate re-
view and undercut the role of NEPA when long-term projects,
faced with uncertain environmental effects, are involved. a5 It
went on to state that the standard set by the majority was too
high for the relevant information to reach the majority's req-
uisite "significance" level and therefore allowed the majority
to glide over the problems associated with the uncertain envi-
ronmental consequences."a
The dissent opined that the approach taken by the dis-
trict court was the correct one a7 and this approach was in
agreement with the Ninth Circuit's holdings in Warm Springs
Dam a It further stated that besides the agency's continuing
duty to monitor any relevant new information, "it must act
reasonably to gather and evaluate that information. A deci-
sion not to undertake a supplemental EIS must be rationally
61. In a footnote, the majority stated that the continuing duty to supplement is
practically limited by the nature and life cycle of the project or action and the kind of
new information involved. Id. at 418 n.6.
62. Id. at 419.
63. See generally id. at 420-424.
64. Id. at 424. The court, including Judge Cudahy, also vacated the injunction.
65. Id. at 428.
66. Id. at 429.
67. Id.
68. 621 F.2d 1017. See supra note 49.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss2/6
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based on a careful review of the new information. "69
In conclusion, the dissenting opinion noted that under
NEPA the "standard of review is not an exacting one."70 "An
agency need only take reasonable steps, in light of the poten-
tial for significant new information, to ensure that it will con-
sider relevant new information concerning the environmental
impacts of the agency's actions. "71 The dissent agreed with
the district court that the Navy did not take these reasonable
steps and was therefore correct in ordering the SEIS.7 s
IV. Analysis
Both the district court73 and the Seventh Circuit74 recog-
nized that the CEQ regulations do not define the term "signif-
icant. '7 5 Both courts also attempted to cure this inadequacy
by providing their own standard for the term.7" The courts
were in agreement that an agency has a continuing duty to
monitor information relevant to the environment and the pro-
ject being developed.7 "Indeed, an agency cannot fulfill its
69. 745 F.2d at 430.
70. Id. at 432.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 578 F. Supp. 1327, 1361 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
74. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1984).
75. See also Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2nd Cir. 1972)(noting the
absence of any legislative or administrative interpretation of the term "significant" as
it relates to "major federal action" under 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1982)).
76. "The adequacy of an agency's response to significant new information is a
point on which authority is scarce, and the question will assume ever greater impor-
tance as the life cycle of projects requiring NEPA compliance lengthen." Warm
Springs Dam, 621 F.2d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 1980)(Kennedy, J., concurring). See also
Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1037 (2d. Cir.
1983), wherein the court stated "we have had no prior occasion to interpret these
guidelines with respect to where lies the responsibility for a determination that new
information is so 'significant' as to mandate an SEIS." (The Court of Appeals af-
firmed a district court order that the Army Corps of Engineers prepare an SEIS with
regard to fishery issues: and it reversed the district court's order that an SEIS be
prepared with regard to non-fishery issues, such as costs and alternatives.)
77. 745 F.2d at 418; 578 F. Supp. at 1360. See also 745 F.2d at 430 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting)( citing Warm Springs Dam, 621 F.2d at 1023-26). See also Massachusetts
v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 948-49 (1st Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d at 1034-37; Society for Animal Rights, Inc. v. Schlesinger,
512 F.2d 915, 917-18 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
11
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duty to supplement an EIS without continuing to monitor
sources of new and relevant information. '78
The Seventh Circuit held that the new information must
provide a seriously different picture of the environmental con-
sequences of the federal action before an SEIS must be pre-
pared.7 9 They recognized that the duties imposed under
NEPA are "essentially procedural" and include a weighing of
the substantive goals of NEPA.80Yet, while acknowledging the procedural aspects of
NEPA, the Court of Appeals has tried to give substance to the
CEQ regulation involved.81 The majority attempts to define
"significant" by using the phrase "seriously different picture."
It succeeds in substituting its phrase for the CEQ term, yet it
never tries to give meaning to the phrase "seriously different
picture." Therefore, the Seventh Circuit's attempt to clarify
the regulation suffers from the same problem of vagueness as
the regulation itself.8 2 The majority does not establish guide-
lines that an agency may use for future projects, but rather,
replaces one uncertain term with an equally ambigious
phrase.83
There is the possibility that, under the majority's stan-
dard, a piece of information may not be considered "serious,"
yet when considered with other "non-serious" information,
the aggregate may reach the seriously different picture stan-
dard. However, the majority does not explain what the neces-
sary accumulation of information would be in this situation.
The Seventh Circuit disposes of this issue quickly in a foot-
note by attempting to use power consumption forecasts as a
78. 745 F.2d at 431 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
79. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
80. 745 F.2d at 416, citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
81. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (1984).
82. In general, the language of NEPA has been seen as "woefully ambigious."
Voight, H. The National Environmental Policy Act and the Independent Regulatory
Agency, 5 Nat. Resources Law. 13 (1972). Specifically, the term "significant", as it
relates to § 102(2)(c) of NEPA has been described as "amorphous." Hanley v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d at 830.
83. At best, the majority states in the present case what is not information that
presents a seriously different picture. See generally 745 F.2d at 418-24.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss2/6
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comparison.8 4 This is a weak argument since energy consump-
tion forecasts can be developed through the use of relatively
stable information (e.g. peak demand statistics).8 5 The case at
hand, however, presents scientific data which the Navy admit-
ted was neither fully explored nor fully understood at the
time of the 1977 EIS .8  The dissent also questions the "qual-
ity" of new information which is needed to sound the alarm
for an SEIS. 87
Another problem connected with the seriously different
picture definition enunciated in Weinberger is that the stan-
dard was set so high that it may hinder the goals of NEPA 8
By setting the standard of significance for new information at
such a high level and requiring the reviewing court to look at
the substance of the new information, the majority's ruling
may have the practical effect of reducing the number of
SEIS's that are prepared.8 9 By requiring that the significance
of new information be "serious," the Seventh Circuit is limit-
ing the number of instances that an agency's information will
reach the necessary level to require an SEIS.90 This would
84. Id. at 418-19 n.6. The majority relied on Friends of the River v. Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Comm'n., 720 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1983), which involved the issuance
of a license for the construction of a hydroelectric plant. While it is true that Friends
of the River held that it was not necessary to issue an SEIS every time new forecasts
were released, it also stated that a reasonableness standard governs the preparation
of an SEIS. 720 F.2d at 109.
85. 720 F.2d at 96 n.3, 98-99 nn.6 & 7.
86. Id.
87. "Especially when the new information is a steady trickle of scientific studies
of uncertain validity and import, it would be virtually impossible to identify a mo-
ment at which new information becomes 'significant' enough to require a supplemen-
tal EIS." 745 F.2d at 432 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
88. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., the Second Circuit's analysis of significance in relation to the initial
preparation of an EIS. "Since an agency in making a threshold' determination as to
the 'significance' of an action, is called upon to review in a general fashion the same
factors that would be studied in depth for preparation of a detailed environmental
impact statement, § 102(2)(B) requires that some rudimentary procedures be
designed to assure a fair and informed preliminary decision. Otherwise the agency,
lacking essential information, might frustrate the purpose of NEPA by a threshold
determination that an impact statement is unnecessary." Hanley v. Kleindienst, 741
F.2d at 835. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
90. The dissent felt that the "majority's approach.. .unduly restricts NEPA in a
situation where the government acts in the face of uncertain potential environmental
13
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eliminate consideration of any information that, while it may
raise questions that a rational person would wish to further
investigate, does not present a picture serious enough to war-
rant further consideration under the Seventh Circuit's stan-
dard." This may lead to the ignoring of potentially valuable
information.92
The problem which arises from the majority's standard is
that, by waiting for either (1) information to accumulate to
the requisite seriously different picture level or (2) informa-
tion itself that presents a seriously different picture, it may be
too late for any necessary corrective action. The problems that
might be encountered at this point may be considerably more
harmful and costly than the costs associated with preparing
an SEIS in the early stages of a project.93 Minimization of
these potential problems by giving adequate consideration to
the environmental concerns early on in a project is one of the
policies established under NEPA 4
consequences." 745 F.2d at 429 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
91. "It is not readily conceivable that Congress meant to allow agencies to avoid
this central requirement [the use of formalized procedures for the preparation of im-
pact statements] by reading 'significant' to mean only 'important,' 'momentous,' or
the like. One of the purposes of the impact statement was to insure that the relevant
environmental data are before the agency and considered by it..." Hanley v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d at 837 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
92. "There has been increasing recognition that man and all other life on this
earth may be significantly affected by actions which on the surface appear insignifi-
cant." Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1322 (8th
Cir. 1974)(affirming district court order instructing the U.S. Forest Service to prepare
an EIS with regard to the cutting and selling of timber).
93.
The Love Canal disaster developed over several decades, as the impact of
leaching chemicals is uncertain and slow in developing. The visible effects are
limited, and some may be attributed to other causes. When today's unin-
formed visitor to the Love Canal neighborhood feels a chill, it is from the
sight of abandoned homes, with boarded up windows* and doors and over-
grown yards, all surrounded by a high chain-link fence. What the visitor sees
are signs of the reactions to things that lie essentially hidden, detectable only
by special procedures. Chemicals are present under the ground, in the yards
and houses, and in the air, in people's bodies; but Love Canal is a conceptual
event, for the physical manifestations can be readily overlooked, ignored, de-
nied, and minimized.
A. Levine, Love Canal: Science, Politics, and People 1 (1982).
94. See supra note 20. "The 'detailed statement' it [NEPA] requires is the out-
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It would appear then that the burden on the reviewing
court is not eased by the majority's standard for new informa-
tion. The courts are now required to possess greater knowl-
edge concerning any relevant environmental and/or scientific
matters than they were required to in the past. However,
courts are not equipped to, nor should they 5 become experts
in the areas of science and the environment so that they may
be in a position to decide if information is serious enough to
warrant an SEIS." Rather, remembering that NEPA is "es-
sentially procedural, 97 courts should ensure that all relevant
information is considered, and a reasoned determination is
made."
The better method for determining the significance of
new information, and at the same time limiting the reviewing
court's involvement to a review of the procedure used, is that
adopted by the district court, which was based on the Warm
Springs Dam analysis.9' This method of review, based on the
ward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered. . ." An-
drus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979).
95. "The district court does not sit as a super-agency empowered to substitute
its scientific expertise... for the evidence received and considered by the agency
which prepared the EIS." Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs., 701
F.2d at 1029 (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehike, 368 F. Supp. 231, 240
(W.D. Mo. 1973) aff'd, 497 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974).
96. "Courts, with their overloaded dockets and limited expertise in environmen-
tal matters, should be the last resort in the process to achieve NEPA compliance, not
the only one." Note, Environmental Impact Statements: Instruments for Environ-
mental Protection or Endless Litigation?, 11 Fordham Urb. L.J. 527, 566 (1983)(ad-
vocating that the powers of CEQ be broadened to include review of agency actions).
97. See supra, note 78 and accompanying text.
98. Warm Springs Dam, 621 F.2d at 1024. See also Massachusetts v. Watt, 716
F.2d at 948 (lawfulness of the Department of the Interior's decison not to supplement
an EIS reviewed in light of reasonableness of the decision); Friends of the River v.
FERC, 720 F.2d at 109; Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d at 1034
("Enforcement of NEPA requires that the responsible agencies be compelled to pre-
pare a new SEIS.. .based on adequately compiled information, analyzed in a reasona-
ble fashion.") "The information generated in fulfillment of NEPA's 'procedural' du-
ties may affect substantive decision making in two other ways by providing grounds
for enforcing the substantive duties of other environmental statutes and by providing
information and time." Murchison, Does NEPA Matter? -An Analysis of the Histori-
cal Development and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 18 U. Rich. L. Rev. 557, 614 (1984).
99. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Judge Cudahy in his dissent also
15
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reasonableness of the agency's decision, is supported by other
circuits 00 and entails a four-part test to be employed by a
court in deciding the significance of new information.101
The first question to be asked is whether the information
is new.102 While this may seem to be obvious, the district
court held that it must be more than just a confirmation of
"earlier-known information."'' 0 Therefore, it should be infor-
mation that was not known at the time of the EIS and should
be able to add to the discussion of the environmental
consequences.10'
Next is the question of whether the information is meri-
torious; that is, have experts in the particular field assessed it
as valid and important or worthy of further inquiry. 05 This
prong of the test lends considerable credence to the informa-
tion in terms of its significance. If an expert in that field has
recognized this information as being noteworthy and/or as be-
ing valid, it would seem that an agency should at least con-
sider its possible effects on the project. Recognition by an ex-
pert could be a signal to an agency that the information is
worthy of further investigation and this signal could aid in the
agency's monitoring of new information. 06
The third part of the test is whether the information is
accessible.10 7 The information should be published or some-
agreed that this was the correct approach to this problem. 745 F.2d at 429-31
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
100. See supra note 35.
101. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
102. 578 F. Supp. at 1361.
103. Id.
104. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an SEIS "is not essen-
tial every time new information comes to light after an EIS is prepared. Were we to
hold otherwise, the threshold decison not to supplement an EIS would become as
burdensome as preparing the supplemental EIS itself." California v. Watt, 683 F.2d
1253, 1268 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court's decision that an SEIS was not
required to incorporate the latest estimates of oil and gas reserve in the outer con-
tinential shelf off the coast of California).
105. 578 F. Supp. at 1361.
106. As the majority stated, it is not enough that the information be new. In-
deed, an agency need not review all new information that comes to light. 745 F.2d at
418.
107. 578 F. Supp. at 1361.
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how made available to the agency. If it has been published,
then it is probable that the information has been subject to
review by peers in that field. Publication can lend credence to
the information (if the publication has been widely accepted)
and possibly open doors to additional new information. This
additional new information may either criticize or support the
information in question. This would lead to greater input into
the agency decison resulting in a more informed decision,
which is one of the goals of NEPA. 10 8
The district court's fourth test is to decide if the new in-
formation is relevant to the environmental concerns about the
proposed action and "[w]hether it is the kind of information a
rational decision-maker would want to consider" in deciding
to proceed or not with the project.109 Even if the information
is not conclusive, if it raises enough questions that a rational
person would like to inquire further into the issues involved,
then it would seem that it should be considered. This is a
more realistic, sensible approach to the problem, as opposed
to deciding the seriousness of the information.
Finally, the Warm Springs Dam analysis offered another
factor that should be added to the test used by the district
court. The reviewing court should look at the degree to which
the agency supported its decision to supplement or not, with a
statement of explanation or additional data.110 The inclusion
of this factor would help promote the NEPA policies of (1)
showing consideration for the environmental concerns in-
volved; (2) informing the public; and (3) providing a record
for judicial review."'
V. Conclusion
The question of how significant new information is in re-
lation to a federal project is one that is open to many inter-
pretations. Possibly, one interpretation for each person that
reviews the information. In light of this, it seems rather harsh
108. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
109. 578 F. Supp. at 1361.
110. Warm Springs Dam, 621 F.2d at 1024.
111. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.decision by the agency.
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to hold an agency to the "seriously different picture" standard
set by the Seventh Circuit. Rather, the four-part test that
evaluates the consideration given to the information by the
agency, as discussed by the district court, would seem to be
the better standard. Indeed, it is based on a rational scrutiny
of the evidence and should lead to a more careful and rea-
soned decision by the agency.
Peter A. Turchick
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